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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)

No. 47259-2019

)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

)

V.

)

Bonneville County Case No.

)

CR-2001-26605

)

CHRISTOPHER D. GRIFFITH,

RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

)
)

Issue

Has Grifﬁth failed t0
motion

to correct

an

establish that the district court erred either

illegal sentence, or

by denying

his

by denying his

I.C.R. 35(a)

motion for appointment 0f counsel?

Grifﬁth Has Failed
Correct

To Show

An Illegal

Error In The District Court’s Denial

Sentence,

Or

In

Its

Denial

356, 358-359, 161 P.3d 675, 677-678 (Ct. App. 2007).

ﬁxed.
appeal.

358, 161 P.3d at 677.

EQ
I_d.

at

The

district court

State V. Grifﬁth, 144 Idaho

half,” causing

imposed a uniﬁed

life

him

358-370, 161 P.3d

at

at *1 (Ct.

sentence with 22 years

677—689. In 2008, Grifﬁth ﬁled a post-conviction petition, but

E

Grifﬁth

V. State,

later,

E

State V. Grifﬁth, 157 Idaho 409, 409-410,

rej ected this

336 P.3d 816, 816-817

argument and afﬁrmed the

ineffective for declining t0 call a particular Witness.

(unpublished).

0n the ground

It

WL

Grifﬁth ﬁled an I.C.R. 35(a) motion arguing that his sentence was illegal and

(Ct.

The Idaho Court of Appeals afﬁrmed
that

it

was untimely.

EQ

E m,

County

District

counsel

WL 2185228

at

*2

at *2-3.

E

Idaho Data Repository, State

Court Case N0. CR-2001-26605.

the district court’s denial of that motion.

2015

trial

0f the

the district court’s dismissal of the petition

appears that Grifﬁth ﬁled another I.C.R. 35 motion in 2004.

Grifﬁth, Bonneville

App. 2014).

district court’s denial

motion. Li. Grifﬁn also ﬁled a successive post—conviction petition alleging that his

V.

2015

App. 2015) (unpublished).

The Idaho Court 0f Appeals

1

direct

LC. §§ 18—4004 and 19—2513 required the ﬁxed portion of his sentence to be no more than 10

years.1

was

was

t0 bleed t0 death.

The Idaho Court of Appeals afﬁrmed Grifﬁth’s conviction and sentence on

Years
that

Motion To

Victim’s “pancreas

did not appeal from the district court’s denial of that petition.

2185228

E

The

compressed against the spine, cutting the pancreas nearly in
at

35(a)

Of His Motion For Appointment Of Counsel

In 2002, a jury found Grifﬁth guilty 0f ﬁrst-degree murder.

EQ

Of His Rule

ﬂ

id.

He

did not appeal from

Then, in 2019, 17 years after his conviction, Grifﬁth ﬁled another I.C.R. 35(a) motion to
correct an illegal sentence.

was

In the motion, Grifﬁth argued that his trial counsel

ineffective With respect t0 advice he allegedly gave Grifﬁth regarding a plea offer

the state prior to

in

(R., pp.33-43.)

Which counsel

trial.

(Id.)

Grifﬁth supported the motion with an afﬁdavit from his

criticized his

the underlying proceeding.

counsel to represent

trial

counsel.3

(R., p.45.)

counsel

preparation and advice given t0 Grifﬁth in the course of

(R., pp.40-43.)

Grifﬁth also requested that the

the motion, concluding that Grifﬁth’s argument

scope of a proper I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an

found Grifﬁth’s motion

trial

district court

appoint

(E R., pp.27, 45.)

him?

The court denied

own

made by

t0

illegal sentence.

went beyond the narrow

(R., pp.44-46.)

Because

it

be without merit, the court also denied the motion for appointment 0f

Grifﬁth timely appealed. (R., pp.61-64.)

On appeal, Grifﬁth contends that the district court erred by denying his I.C.R.

35(a) motion.

(Appellant’s brief, pp.7-10.) However, a review of the record and the applicable law reveals that

2

The motion

for appointment

of counsel does not

referenced in the appellate record case

itself

summary and

appear in the appellate record, but

in the district court’s order

it is

denying the

motion.
3

It

appears that the district court received and reviewed Grifﬁth’s motion for appointment of

counsel before

it

received and/or reviewed Grifﬁth’s I.C.R. 35(a) motion.

(E R., pp.47-48.)

The

court denied the motion for appointment 0f counsel after noting that there was n0 I.C.R. 35 motion
pending at the time. (Id.) However, the court reiterated its denial of Grifﬁth’s motion for

subsequent order denying Grifﬁth’s I.C.R. 35(a) motion. (R., p.45.)
After that dismissal was entered, the court additionally dismissed Grifﬁt ’s “renewed” motion for

appointment of counsel in
appointment of counsel.

its

(R., pp.49-53, 57-60.)

Because Grifﬁth’s notice 0f appeal was timely
reiterated its denial of Grifﬁth’s motion for

from the court’s dismissal order in which it
appointment of counsel, the state presumes that the notice was timely with respect
Grifﬁth raises 0n appeal.

to the issues

the district court correctly concluded that Grifﬁth’s ineffective assistance 0f trial counsel argument

is

beyond the narrow scope 0f I.C.R.
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a)

35(a).

a narrow rule that allows a

is

from the face of the record any time. State

that is illegal

1143, 1145 (2009).

“[T]he term

interpreted as a sentence that

‘illegal

is illegal

V.

Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84, 218 P.3d

sentence,’ as utilized

from the face 0f the record,

questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing.”

Li

court t0 correct a sentence

trial

at 86,

by

i.e.,

I.C.R. 35(a)

is

narrowly

does not involve signiﬁcant

218 P.3d

at 1147.

Rule 35(a)

“is

not

a vehicle designed to reexamine the facts underlying the case to determine whether a sentence
illegal.”

I_d.

(citation omitted).

“[R]ather, the rule only applies t0 a narrow category 0f cases in

which the sentence imposes a penalty that is simply not authorized by law.”

Supreme Court has explained
based),

is

United

that the function

t0 “permit correction at

occurring at the

States,

trial

is

I_d.

The United

of Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 (upon Which I.C.R. 35

any time of an

illegal sentence, not t0

J.,

is

re-examine errors

or other proceedings prior t0 the imposition of sentence.” Li. (quoting

385 U.S. 415, 430 (1959) (Stewart,

States

ﬂ

concurring).)

In this case, the district court properly cited Clements and concluded that Grifﬁth’s I.C.R.

35(a) argument

First,

was beyond

the scope of that rule.

Grifﬁth’s argument that his

negotiations

is

sentence that

trial

This conclusion was correct for two reasons.

counsel was ineffective with respect t0 the underlying plea

not even an argument that his uniﬁed

was “simply not authorized by law.”

counsel was ineffective

is

questions 0f fact and that

life

sentence with 22 years

ﬁxed was a

Second, Grifﬁth’s argument that his

the type 0f argument that, though supported

would require an evidentiary

hearing.

by an

trial

afﬁdavit, invokes

The appropriate forum

to raise

such a claim would have been in an

initial

post-conviction petition ﬁled within one year from the

expiration of the time for appeal, LC. § 19-4902(a); 0r in an initial or successive post-conviction
petition ﬁled Within a reasonable time 0f When the claim could

m,

have been discovered, Charboneau

144 Idaho 900, 904-905, 174 P.3d 870, 874-875 (2007); Rhoades

V. State,

148 Idaho 247,

251, 220 P.3d 10066, 1070 (2009). The district court thus correctly denied Grifﬁth’s I.C.R. 35(a)

motion.

On

appeal, Grifﬁth contends that State V. Jensen, 126 Idaho 35, 878 P.2d

209

1994) stands for the proposition that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim

may

brought in an I.C.R. 35(a) motion. (Appellant’s

Jenﬂ,

Court 0f Appeals held that where an individual

brief, p.9.)

is

This

is

incorrect. In

(Ct.

App.

generally be
the Idaho

deprived of the opportunity to ﬁle a timely I. CR.

35(b) motion (Which unlike an I.C.R. 35(a) motion, must be ﬁled within 120 days of the entry of

judgment), the individual

may

request relief through either a post-conviction petition 0r an

untimely I.C.R. 35(b) motion containing evidence 0f counsel’s ineffectiveness. Jensen, 126 Idaho
at 37,

878 P.2d

at

21

1.

Even Where such counsel

ineffectiveness

is

found, and the district court

chooses to consider the merits 0f the untimely I.C.R. 35(b) motion, an individual’s arguments are
still

restricted

by the parameters of I.C.R. 35(a) and

Grifﬁn also contends that the
case” that his sentence

was not

(b), respectively.

district court erred

illegal in light

by concluding

that

it

was

the “law of the

of the Idaho Court of Appeals’ opinion afﬁrming

the district court’s denial 0f Grifﬁn’s previous I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence.

(R., pp.7-8;

ﬂ alﬂ

Grifﬁth, 157 Idaho at 409-410, 336 P.3d at 816-817 (rejecting Grifﬁth’s

argument that Idaho law required the

district court to

impose n0 more than a lO-year ﬁxed portion

0f his sentence). The

state

acknowledges

that the district court’s denial

of Grifﬁth’s prior I.C.R.

35(a) motion did not necessarily preclude a subsequent ﬁnding that Grifﬁth’s sentence

from the face of the record

for

some other reason. However,

this is

was

illegal

of n0 consequence in this case,

because, for the reasons discussed above, the district court also correctly concluded in this case

that

Grifﬁn failed t0 demonstrate any valid reason

The
motion

district court correctly

t0 correct

therefore

an

afﬁrm the

illegal

why his

sentence

concluded that the arguments

was

illegal.

set forth in

Grifﬁn’s I.C.R. 35(a)

sentence were beyond the narrow scope 0f that rule.

district court’s

This Court must

order denying the motion.

Grifﬁth also contends that the

district court erred

by denying

0f counsel to represent him in pursing the I.C.R. 35(a) motion.

his

motion for appointment

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.)

review of the record and applicable law reveals that Grifﬁth has failed to show that the
court erred

by denying

Idaho Code

district

his motion.

§ 19-852(2)(c)

governs the appointment of counsel in post-judgment criminal

That statute requires that counsel be appointed t0 represent an individual pursuing

proceedings.

an I.C.R. 35 motion, “unless the court in Which the proceeding

is

brought determines that

it is

a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to bring at his

expense and

is

therefore a frivolous proceeding.” LC. § 19-852(2)(c);

A

Idaho 522, 523, 873 P.2d 167, 168 (Ct. App. 1994).

motion

is

motion

itself

Idaho

A

at 525,

873 P.2d

at 170.

Thus, a

that

district court is

also State V.

own

Wade, 125

determination of Whether an I.C.R. 35

frivolous for purposes of applying LC. § 19-852(2)(c)

and any accompanying documentation

ﬂ

not

may

Within

is

based upon the contents of the

support the motion.

its

discretion to

Wade, 125

deny a request

for

court appointed counsel under LC. § 19-852(2)(c) if the court appropriately ﬁnds that the claims

presented are frivolous after reviewing the contents of the motion. Swisher

V. State,

129 Idaho

467, 468-69, 926 P.2d 1314, 13 15-16 (Ct. App. 1996).

On
represent

appeal, Grifﬁth contends that the district court

him pursuant

does not so hold.

to

Wall

V.

Kholi, 562 U.S. 545 (201

was required

to appoint counsel t0

(Appellant’s brief, pp.6-7.) W_a11

1).

Supreme Court instead held

In W_a11, the United States

that a properly—ﬁled

motion for sentence reduction ﬁled

in state court tolled the statute

habeas petition. W_a11, 562 U.S.

547-560. This has no application t0 the present case.

As

set forth above,

at

Grifﬁth

made no showing

motion for appointment 0f counsel, the court stated

of limitations for ﬁling a federal

that his sentence

that

it

was

In denying his

illegal.

had found Grifﬁth’s I.C.R. 35(a) motion

“t0 be Without merit.” (R., p.45.) For all 0f the reasons set forth

above as

t0

why the district court

correctly concluded that Grifﬁth’s I.C.R. 35(a) lacked merit, Grifﬁth cannot

show

that the court

abused its discretion in denying his motion for appointment of counsel. Because Grifﬁth has failed
t0 demonstrate that the district court

abused

its

discretion, this

Court must afﬁrm that denial order.

Conclusion

The

state respectfully requests this

Court t0 afﬁrm the

Grifﬁth’s I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence, and
for appointment

its

district court’s

order denying

order denying Grifﬁth’s motion

of counsel.

DATED this 29th day 0f January, 2020.
Mark W. Olson
MARK W. OLSON

/s/

Deputy Attorney General
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Mark W. Olson
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